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NO. 30 APRIL 2021 Introduction 
India: An Ambivalent Partner for the West 
Growing Commonalities, Growing Differences 
Christian Wagner and Jana Lemke 
The relationship between India and Western countries is increasingly characterised 
by a paradox. On the one hand, the country’s rise has caused both sides to increasingly 
share geostrategic interests, for example in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, dif-
ferences are growing as New Delhi’s domestic policy moves further and further from 
Western ideals – this applies to economic policy as well as the state of Indian democ-
racy. This change is affecting India’s relations with Germany and Europe as the pro-
motion of Indian industry and the restriction of democratic rights also affect Euro-
pean companies and civil society organisations respectively. The narrative of a part-
nership with India based on shared values, which has been cultivated for decades in 
Europe and the USA, will shift more towards coinciding strategic interests and less 
towards common democratic values. 
 
India’s rise since the 1990s has made it an 
important partner for Western countries. It 
boasts a growing number of strategic part-
nerships and economic successes, carries 
weight in institutions of global governance 
and participates in the Quadrilateral Secu-
rity Dialogue (the Quad) – all of which 
underscore India’s newfound geostrategic 
importance. The Biden administration has 
reiterated that the country is a central pillar 
of the USA’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The Euro-
pean Union has announced a connectivity 
partnership with India that will put the 
already good relations between the two on 
an even broader footing. The German gov-
ernment’s Indo-Pacific guidelines empha-
sise cooperation with “value partners” in 
the region, which includes India. New 
Delhi, for its part, needs bilateral exchange 
with Western states in order to advance the 
country’s path towards economic and mili-
tary modernisation. 
But despite this new geostrategic com-
mon ground, the West’s relations with 
India are likely to become more difficult, 
not easier. The reasons for this are found in 
various domestic political developments in 
the world’s largest democracy. First, India 
has seen the dismantling of democratic 
rights since Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 2014. 
For example, Freedom House’s Freedom in 
the World 2021 report rated Indian democ-
racy as “partly free” for the first time since 
1997/ 1998, while the Swedish V-Dem Insti-
tute recently declared the country an “elec-
toral autocracy”. Secondly, New Delhi is 
pursuing a new economic policy of self-
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reliance, thereby promoting national in-
dustry. 
India’s Democracy: 
Unity over Diversity? 
The Modi government was endorsed by the 
electorate for its vision of a new India. In 
its 2019 re-election, it won 303 seats (37 per 
cent) in the parliament, an even larger ab-
solute majority than it achieved with its 
2014 election victory when it won 282 seats 
(31 per cent). Of its three key promises put 
forth during the 2014 election campaign, 
the BJP has so far implemented two. First, 
the special rights for the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir were abolished; it was con-
verted into two union territories in August 
2019. Second, an October 2019 Supreme 
Court verdict allowed the construction of a 
Ram temple in the northern Indian state of 
Ayodhya – a project that attracted contro-
versy for decades because a mosque once 
stood on the site. The third promise (yet to 
be fulfilled) is the introduction of a uniform 
civil code, which would presumably curtail 
the rights of religious minorities. 
The BJP’s ideological basis for the re-
orientation of the country is rooted in the 
idea that India is first and foremost a Hindu 
state. Hindu nationalism is based on the 
notion of Hinduness (Hindutva), the basic 
foundations of which were formulated in 
the 1920s and 1930s by V. D. Savarkar and 
long-standing leader of the National Volun-
teer Corps (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, 
RSS) M. S. Golwalkar. As an ideology, Hin-
dutva is modelled along the lines of ethnic 
nationalism of 19th and 20th century 
Europe. Its aim is to create a Hindu nation 
(Hindu Rashtra) based on a common lan-
guage, history, culture, geography and an-
cestry. Initially, this strain of thought was 
also associated with the rejection of outside 
influences, in that the conquest of India by 
Muslims and later by the British was seen 
as the cause of the supposed decline of Hin-
dus. Sentiments of the unity of the Hindu 
nation find expression today in slogans 
and demands such as “One Nation”, “One 
Constitution” and “One Language”. Until 
now, the principle of “Unity in Diversity” 
was considered one of the central founda-
tions of the Indian constitution. The ideas 
of Hindutva, on the other hand, tend to 
subscribe to a principle that prioritizes 
“Unity over Diversity”. 
The shift towards an “illiberal India” 
(Sumit Ganguly) is evident in several ways. 
First, criticism of the government is seen 
as increasingly undesirable. Critical intel-
lectuals and media as well as national and 
international civil society organisations 
increasingly face bureaucratic controls or 
prosecution. For example, since 2014, the 
number of indictments for activities that 
“endanger the state” has risen significantly. 
Furthermore, in 2018 and 2019, India’s 
internet was shut down more often than in 
any other democracy. The accompanying 
restrictions on fundamental rights are re-
flected in negative ratings in the 2020 World 
Press Freedom Index and the Human Freedom 
Index: 2020, among others (see Figure 1). 
More recently, in summer 2020, it was 
revealed that the government used the 
Coronavirus pandemic as an excuse to craft 
a new media strategy targeting unpopular 
reporting. In March 2021, the government 
passed new regulations for internet corpo-
rations, thereby granting it further oppor-
tunities to silence critical media. 
Second, by shifting personnel, the gov-
ernment has ensured that it gains more 
influence in institutions previously con-
sidered independent, including the Central 
Bank and the National Election Commis-
sion. Third, the Supreme Court is no longer 
willing to review contentious government 
decisions in a timely manner, including fed-
eral disputes. This was the case in August 
2019 with the partition and conversion of 
the singular state of Jammu and Kashmir 
into two union territories administered by 
New Delhi, an action that was executed 
without the consent of the elected state gov-
ernment. In autumn 2020, the national par-
liament also passed far-reaching agricultur-
al reforms even though this sector is the 
responsibility of the states according to the 
constitution. Furthermore, in spring 2021, 
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the national government curtailed the 
powers of the elected government of the 
New Delhi National Capital Territory. 
India’s Economy: Independence 
over World Market Integration? 
Modi’s assumption of office in 2014 was 
accompanied by high hopes that India 
would continue its economic reforms and 
integrate further into the global market. 
Indeed, India improved its position in the 
Ease of Doing Business Index from 140th to 
63rd place between 2014 and 2019. How-
ever, the government did not succeed in 
achieving its aim of increasing the manu-
facturing sector’s share of the gross domes-
tic product to 25 per cent in order to make 
it globally competitive. Instead, its share 
actually declined from 15.1 per cent to 14.8 
per cent between 2014 and 2018. Further-
more, economic growth fell to below 5 per 
cent even before the Coronavirus crisis, 
moving the country further away from the 
government’s 7 per cent target. 
In a speech to the nation on 12 May 2020, 
Prime Minister Modi announced his new 
concept of economic self-reliance (Atmanir-
bhar Bharat). Its historic roots lie in the 
Swadeshi movement, which advocated the 
preferential use of domestically produced 
goods and whose ideas are also reflected 
in the writings of the RSS. Modi thus made 
a U-turn in economic policy, even though 
this had already been foreshadowed by 
Figure 1 
The devolution of democracy-relevant indices for India from 2014 to 2020 
Democracy Index 2014 2020 
Economist Democracy Index Defective democracy 
Rank 27 of 167 
Defective democracy 
Rank 53 of 167 
Freedom House Index Free 
78 points 
Partly free 
67 points (2021) 
Freedom House Index, 





University of Würzburg, 
Democracy Matrix 
Defective democracy  
0,79 points 
Defective democracy 
0.62 points (2019) 
Reporters without Borders, 
World Press Freedom Index 
Difficult situation 
Rank 140 of 180 
Difficult situation 




7.8 points (2013–15) 
Defective democracy 
7.3 points (2017–19) 
Legatum Prosperity Index, 
Personal Freedom 
Rank 78 of 142 Rank 106 of 167 
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy Index 
1 = high; 0 = low 
0.56 points 0.3 points (2019) 
CATO Institute, 
Human Freedom Index 
Rank 87 of 159  Rank 111 of 162 (2018) 
Sources: The Economist, Democracy Index 2020; Democracy Index 2014; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020; 
Freedom in the World 2015; Freedom on the Net 2020; Freedom on the Net 2014; University of Würzburg, Matrix Repre-
sentation 2014; Reporters without Borders, India; World Press Freedom Index 2014; Bertelsmann Foundation, Atlas 
BTI, India Overall Results; Legatum Institute, The Legatum Prosperity Index, Downloads; V-Dem Institute, Country Graph. 
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various decisions in recent years. The policy 
of self-reliance is in line with the “Make in 
India” programme that was introduced in 
2014, which aims to increase exports and 
reduce imports. While Modi denounced 
growing global protectionism at the World 
Economic Forum in 2018, his government 
began raising tariffs again itself. In autumn 
2019, New Delhi withdrew from the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
at the last minute on the grounds that its 
participation in the free trade project would 
further widen its chronic trade deficit with 
China. Indeed, during its border conflict 
with China in summer 2020, India’s govern-
ment tightened its restrictions against Chi-
nese companies. 
Albeit under different political condi-
tions, India had already pursued a course 
of import substitution starting in the 1950s. 
At that time, the country was oriented to-
wards socialist economic models and relied 
on a large state sector. Ultimately, by the 
time it ended in 1991, this policy only 
spurred an average growth of about 3.5 per 
cent. Modi’s current concept, on the other 
hand, aims at privatising often unprofitable 
state-owned enterprises, commercialising 
agriculture and building up national busi-
ness champions, for example in the tech-
nology sector. Prominent critics, such as 
Modi’s former economic advisor Arvind 
Subramanian, object to this path, noting 
that no developing country after the Second 
World War has been able to achieve growth 
of more than 6 per cent through domestic 
demand alone. 
India: An Ambivalent Partner 
For Germany and Europe, India remains a 
key player in the Indo-Pacific in terms of 
foreign and economic policy. Common stra-
tegic interests, also in view of the rise of 
China, will generate new initiatives in areas 
such as connectivity, digitalisation, trans-
portation and the maritime economy, which 
will further deepen cooperation. The tech-
nology transfer afforded by German and 
European companies to India will make an 
important contribution to the country’s 
economic recovery in the aftermath of the 
Coronavirus pandemic. 
But Modi’s new economic policy of self-
reliance will likely make it more difficult in 
the long term for medium-sized companies 
in particular to enter the Indian market. 
This is compounded by repeated criticisms 
from Washington, Brussels and Berlin of 
the Indian government’s dismantling of 
democratic rights, restriction of freedoms 
of expression and the press, and persecu-
tion of religious minorities. India’s foreign 
minister has already signalled that his coun-
try will pay less attention to such Western 
concerns in future. Instead, his ministry is 
already considering creating its own indices 
so that the successes of Indian democracy 
can be better presented internationally. It 
cannot be assumed that international criti-
cism will have any significant influence on 
India’s domestic policy decisions. Thus, in 
the future, the partnership is likely to be 
based on mutual strategic interests more 
than on shared democratic values. 
Dr. Christian Wagner is a Senior Fellow in the Asia Division at SWP. 
Jana Lemke was an intern in the Asia Division at SWP. 
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